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Business process redesign:
the wheel of Ixion
René Ten Bos
Business School Nederland, Herkelum, The Netherlands
Introduction
Our organizations are haunted by a ghost. Some people think that this has been
the case since Taylor invented the principles of scientific management, but it
was not until the 1990s that the ghost was given an appropriate name: Business
Process Redesign (BPR). Other names, however, will do as well: Business
Process Re-engineering or Process Innovation (Davenport, 1992). It is a name
with technological connotations, as if it is meant to denote something venerable.
However, sceptical minds inveigh against the ghost and speak in terms of
Business Panacea Revisited (Willmott, 1994) or Big Personnel Reduction.
Not only are there many different names, we also encounter many definitions
of the phenomenon under discussion. However, the best known and most
popular definition goes like this:
[Business Process Redesign] is the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical contemporary measures of
performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed (Hammer and Champy, 1993, p. 32).
The tone is melodramatic. The defenders of BPR have a distinct revolutionary
pathos. The classical text (Hammer and Champy, 1993) is presented as nothing
less than a “manifesto for a business revolution”. BPR is assumed to have
fundamental, radical, and dramatic consequences. Its defenders argue that it is
about nothing less than a revolution in the way we think about organizations.
Finally, we are able to heave a sigh of relief because we can throw off the age-old
yoke of labour division and replace it by an overall orientation on business
processes. Of course, the new type of orientation that is the result of BPR-efforts
is fully instrumental to increased performance: low costs, high quality, excellent
service and astonishing speed. Dissenters who are not aroused by the promises
of BPR are tiresome spoilsports who ought to be shot (Kalgaard, 1993, p. 71). As
a matter of fact, hard-baked revolutionaries cannot tolerate forces that impede
the pace of change. It may be concluded that there is no place whatsoever for the
“incrementalist orthodoxy that has prevailed for 30 years” (Grint, 1995, p. 109).
Despite the exuberance with which it was welcomed, BPR hardly guarantees
unequivocal success. On the contrary, even Michael Hammer has admitted that
50 per cent to 70 per cent of all BPR efforts fail (Hammer and Stanton, 1995).
Other gurus (Ballé, 1995; Obeng and Crainer, 1996) also acknowledge serious
problems with implementation. Problems are diverse: human nature simply
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does not comply with such a technologically- and numerically-driven approach
like BPR; BPR projects tend to be fairly expensive (Metze, 1996; Willmott, 1994);
BPR is invariably presented as if it can be done in isolation of the social and
cultural context (Grint, 1995), and so on. One may really wonder why, in face of
all the practical problems attached to BPR, the gurus and their leaders firmly
hold on to it. The German philosopher Hegel once told his audience at the Berlin
university that if his philosophical system for the explanation of the world
would prove in some way or the other erroneous, this should not be attributed
to the system itself but to the world. In similar fashion, the advocates of BPR
immunize their change programme against any form of empirical doubt.
This article sympathizes with the aforementioned spoilsports and tries to
dampen the enthusiasm for BPR. In expressing my sympathy I will adopt the
same sort of pathos that is typical of Hammer. I believe that unrelenting pathos
might be the only way to counterbalance the revolutionary climate that
Hammer and fans are trying to stimulate. Although efforts to enhance the
efficiency of organizational processes are not reprehensible per se – we should
not forget that large-scale organizational inefficiency may be one of the major
reasons for environmental damage – I believe that the widespread enthusiasm
among managers for change programmes like BPR is very alarming. I will
show this by formulating ten points of critique which I will present in section 3.
In the next section, I will discuss some essential elements of BPR and also enter
into some recent developments in what, unfortunately, tends to become an
important managerial discipline.
The life of a ghost
In one of his few unpretentious moods, Michael Hammer (1990) has contended
that he did not invent BPR, but merely coined a catching name for a trend that
was taking place in some “remarkably successful” organizations. What do these
organizations know that others do not know?
The first and perhaps most important thing on the way to success is
abandoning the functional structure of the organization. Adam Smith has led us
to believe that the function or the task is the ultimate core of each work
organization. Given this assumption, the managerial challenge is to co-ordinate
the diversity of functions and tasks within the organization. In other words,
managers should design the organizational structure. This structure has been
defined as, first, the way tasks are divided and, second, the way in which they
are co-ordinated (Mintzberg, 1983). However, co-ordination is expensive since
you need co-ordinators. Unfortunately, these people are not involved in doing
any real work; they only take care that specific portions of real work are put
together. The problem is that co-ordinators simply represent costs because they
do not add any value since adding value is, ex hypothesi, the prerogative of real
workers.
But how can an organization avoid co-ordination? After all, if one leaves all
the real workers to fend for themselves, control problems will become
paramount. If one takes away the glue that has been applied between the tasks,
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the organization will become liable to fragmentation, chaos, and anarchy, the
three arch-enemies of rational management. The dilemma can thus be
formulated as follows: in face of the huge costs of co-ordination organizations
should get rid of it if they are to stay competitive, but such a clearance
inevitably causes serious control problems.
BPR’s solution to the problem is deceptively simple: “horizontal
compression” (Hammer and Champy, 1993, pp. 51-3). Employees should not
only carry out their tasks but also co-ordinate them, which entails a
compression of the organizational hierarchy. According to the defenders of
BPR, the advantage of horizontal compression is that you will keep co-
ordination problems at bay. The “case worker” (Hammer and Champy, 1993, p.
52) will develop an insight in the total process that should be carried out by the
organization[1].
The second trend signalled by Hammer is that successful organizations seem
to adopt a process orientation. A process is defined as “a collection of activities
that takes one of more imputs and creates an output that is of value to the
customer” (Hammer and Champy, 1993, p. 35). The adoption of a process
orientation implies nothing less than a paradigm shift: task focus is replaced by
process focus. In consultancy language this implies a shift from vertical and
functional structures to horizontal work flows (Van der Linden, Van der Meer
and Raaijmakers, 1993); in academic language the shift is from differentiation to
de-differentiation (Willmott, 1994) or integration. The latter word has gained an
almost mystical status in the world of managers. Integration is the panacea for
organizations that want to become customer friendly. What the protagonists of
BPR have in mind is a fully integrated process which is pulled by the customer
who appears as the moral figurehead of employees in the organization.
But where exactly is customer friendliness to be gained? If the entire working
process in the organization has become the responsibility of a minimal number
of “case workers”, the organization has in effect removed many obstacles to
optimal and speedy service. These obstacles are, of course, the inevitable side-
effect of functional structures in which an employee who carries out task 1
“pushes” the result of his/her work to the next employee who has to carry out
task 2; ultimately, some result is handed over to the customer by the tenth
employee. The problem, of course, is that employees who carry out task 1, 2 and
3, are miles away from the customer and only work for their immediate boss
and workmates and perhaps also for their own good. From the employee’s
perspective, the customer is behind the horizon of his or her department. The
third aspect of the trend observed by Hammer is that customers should be
brought, no matter what it takes, within the range of each employee. Since the
customer is the most important receiving end of organizational action, customer
focus is a condition sine qua non for true competitiveness.
Interestingly, the metaphors of “push” and “pull” are well-known in the world
of production/operations management. The difference between “push” and
“pull” might be seen as a difference between operations systems that are
“resource driven” and those that are “customer driven” (Harvey, 1990, pp. 177.f)
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The classic (modernist) example of an operations systems that is resource
driven is Fordism “where portions of work are pushed from one processing
stage to the other” (Alders, 1993). If we are to believe people like Harvey and
Alders we are now witnessing a transition from Fordist operations systems to
(postmodernist) Kanban-systems “where components of end products are only
manufactured if the next stage (i.e. the ‘customer’) needs them” (Alders, 1993).
This fundamental customer orientation allows organizations to prevent the
(very expensive) accumulation of inventories. In Fordism the capacity of each
processing stage (and not the needs of the internal or external customer)
determines the quantities that are produced. Inventories are necessary in order
to smooth out unbalances in the production process. Inventories, however, are as
expensive as co-ordinators whose main reason for being is to smooth out
unbalances in the administrative process.
It might be argued that the ideas behind Kanban-systems are very similar to
those that drive BPR. In a way BPR simply adopts well-known logistic
principles in order to impose them on administrative procedures within
organizations. I think, therefore, that the popularity of BPR is an indication of
the trust that organizations increasingly put in technocratic solutions for
problems which are not necessarily of technical nature.
This might, indeed, be seen as the fourth aspect of the trend observed by
Hammer. After a decade in which culture was the main target of organizational
change, we are back to technocratic basics. One glance at the different
backgrounds of BPR-protagonists is enough. Almost without any exception,
writers on the topic are computer engineers or information specialists: Hammer
and Champy (1993), Huff (1992), Rai and Paper (1994) are but a few examples.
This points to a very serious problem: there are only few people with a non-
technical background who publish about BPR. If there are publications written
by non-specialists (e.g. Grint, 1995; Willmott, 1994) they will very likely not be
read by many managers. A serious discussion is hardly possible under such
circumstances.
Hammer is the most important representant of those who opt for BPR. He
claims that many organizations do not have the slightest idea about what might
be possible by means of information technology (IT). Many organizations
invested heavily in IT during the 1980s, but they did not fundamentally change
their work processes. For too long a time, IT merely speeded up the existing
work process. It, however, did not contribute to its fundamental
reconceptualization. A missed opportunity with detrimental consequences.
Merely speeding up the working process, Hammer claims, has only tempted
members of organizations to store massive amounts of redundant information.
Why is this the case?
Within traditional, functionally-oriented organizations, the information
system looks like a collection of disconnected tubes. Thanks to the enormous
information processing capacity of IT, each tube is inevitably going to be
jampacked with information nobody is waiting for or with information that has
already been stored elsewhere in the system. The competitive advantage that
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might be generated by speeding up the information process is virtually
eliminated by a redundant viscosity in each tube. In similar fashion, the
production process within Fordist operational systems stagnates due to
overproduction at a particular workstation. Systems that are used within
organizations are just like people: when they eat too much, the blood in their
vessels will inevitably clog.
Hammer recommends a strict diet. Paradoxically, the weapon that might cut
away the fat is IT. The attack on excess fat can only become a success if
organizations come to a real understanding of IT. If there is something new to
BPR, it must be its emphasis on IT as something which makes functional
structures redundant. Since Adam Smith we have thought that these structures
were indispensable within organizations. Indeed, without such a structure one
could hardly speak of organizations. There was no other option than to take the
structural paradox of the division of labour (differentiation) versus the co-
ordination of tasks (integration) for granted. And now we hear people talking
about organizations that should dispense with structure altogether (Huff, 1993).
It is possible to get rid of the structure if one no longer makes a distinction
between execution and communication. In other words, employees should take
up the responsibility for co-ordinating the task they are carrying out (Hammer,
1990, p. 111).
This allows us to identify a fifth aspect of the trend Hammer observes: a
dawning awareness of the possibilities IT offers. Aided by IT, the organization
is able to redesign processes in such a way that the individual case worker is
enabled to carry out tasks that were formerly divided between inadequately co-
ordinated employees. Of course, not everything can be carried out by one
individual, but in order to circumvent this minor problem the organization
might form so-called “case teams”. The members of these teams enjoy, without
a single exception, the benefits of real-time connection to the central computer
system which can best be seen as a collective brain that replaces the members’
individual brains. In other words, the case-team is expected to perform as a
“virtual individual” (Willmott, 1994).
Summarizing, BPR is a trend which can be characterized as follows:
(1) Organizations try to get rid of the functional and vertical straitjacket
inherent to their structures.
(2) Organizations focus their attention to processes.
(3) Organizations canonize the customer in the sense that employees are
encouraged to interpret the customer as their boss and employer.
(4) Organizations increasingly suspect “soft” options for fundamental
change and put their faith in technocratic solutions.
(5) Organizations discover the unknown possibilities of IT.
How seriously should we take BPR? And how far-reaching are its consequences?
McHugh et al. (1995, p. 14) have argued that there are three BPR versions. The
first one stands for several cost-cutting and efficiency measures; catchwords are
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divestments, delayering and downsizing. The second one refers to ways in
which the organization might try to achieve “best practice status in one or more
core business processes”; the idea here is simply to outwit the competitor in
different areas. The third version of BPR subscribes to the ideas of cost-cutting
and best practice, but also claims to create new markets and to “re-invent the
industry”. McHugh et al. (1995) dub this version of BPR “BreakPoint Business
Process Re-engineering” which aims to link innovation to unrivalled customer
orientation.
I would like to argue that it is this BreakPoint version that takes BPR to its
extreme: a holy war is declared on each form of differentiation. Superior
customer orientation implies that the organization ceases to exist as an isolated
entity. McHugh et al. (1995) extol the idea of “holonic” networks in which
organizations co-operate in an organic way in order to take optimum advantage
of the possibilities embodied by the customer. They emphasize that such
holonic networks should be seen as the logical sequel to what used to be BPR.
Within these networks, each form of differentiation is banned: borders between
several departments and, indeed, organizations themselves (i.e. so-called
“holons”) have evaporated. IT, of course, comes to the fore as the big evaporator
in the art of re-engineering; it even cancels all geographic differences.
The idea behind these holonic networks is that they can adopt whatever form
is necessary in order to cope with a new situation. The many different forms
that might be taken on can best be seen as “virtual companies”. Only those
holons are accepted in the virtual company that are able, in cooperation with
other holons, to engender total customer satisfaction. Eventually, the ultimate
differentiation, i.e. the fundamental distinction between buyer and seller, is
taken away. Normann and Ramirez (1993), for example, have described how the
customer him/herself might become actively engaged in the production process
by assuming responsibility for the addition of value embedded in the product of
service.
McHugh et al. (1995) use this idea to describe how the customer determines
the actual size and form of the holonic network. Customers are no longer seen
as passive consumers, but as “prosumers” who are actively engaged in the
design of the product or service. Thus, if a particular product or service does not
prove satisfactory, the customer-prosumer is responsible too. After all,
prosumers are expected to shape the network in such a way that the processes
within it can help to satisfy his or her needs. Central to this process are two
ideas:
(1) the holon as such is “unable by itself to create a BreakPoint in the
market”; only a virtual company can do this;
(2) the customer should become a part of the network.
To put the second idea metaphorically, the network should eat the customer in
order to become or to behave like the customer. This brings the quest for
oneness which drives BPR-efforts to a conclusion.
Now I will turn to the task of criticizing BPR and the ideas behind it.
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Exorcizing the ghost
The reception of management texts differs from culture to culture. Rhetorics
that are quite acceptable in the USA might be outrageous elsewhere. Many of
the managers with whom I worked in both The Netherlands and The
Netherlands Antilles are appalled by the arrogance with which Hammer and
Champy (1993) present their ideas. The revolutionary pathos, the absence of
even the slightest of doubts, the unfair critique of traditional work methods, and
the vehemence with which they denounce “the management fads of the last 20
years” (Hammer and Champy, 1993, p. 25) are rubbing many a manager the
wrong way. The claim that these fads directly helped to undermine
organizational performance in the USA is never seriously backed up by
evidence and is simply taken for granted. We are only presented with a few
scantily documented success stories of companies adopting BPR-like ideas. It is
no wonder that many managers with whom I debated the ideas behind BPR
think that it is merely one of many fads that cross their way. It is suspected that
Hammer and Champy’s indictment against managerial fads merely serves to
increase their own fad’s marketability.
Despite all suspicions, BPR still seems to attract managers and consultants,
even in The Netherlands. The topic received a fair amount of (non-academic)
attention in management journals such as Holland Management Review.
However, articles devoted to the subject have almost invariably been written by
management consultants, i.e. by people who have a vested interest in selling the
idea. The next passage illustrates my point:
Redesign is good. Redesign is a must. In our practice we notice that many organizations,
whether or not without considerable help, go through a fantastic learning process if they
strike out upon the path of redesign. In most cases an organization will emerge that performs
better and extracts more energy from its people (Batelaan, 1993, p. 89; my translation).
Batelaan, who is a consultant himself, warns his readers not to put their trust in
consultants. Success of organizational change programmes depends, he claims,
on the organization and not on the consultant. Batelaan may be very right in
this, but he suggests, only a few lines later, that consultants may be perfectly
able to guide the organization through the process of change provided that
“they employ methods that suit the organization”. BPR, of course, happens to
suit any organization. The warning to be careful with opportunistic consultants
echoes Hammer and Champy’s denouncement of consultancy fads and merely
serves narrow commercial objectives.
But here I shall leave my critique as to how BPR generally is presented for
what it is and turn to the ideas behind it.
BPR is not strategic
BPR’s central goal is improving the efficiency of the operational process within
organizations. There is at best some casual attention for strategic issues.
McHugh et al. (1995, pp. 67-8, 185), for example, discuss the necessity to replace
strategic planning with strategic thinking, but their ideas are utterly superficial
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and very reminiscent of similar ideas proposed by Hamel and Prahalad (1994)
or Mintzberg (1994). I think this lack of interest in strategic issues is typical for
the bulk of BPR literature and practices. Strategy might, as will become clear
below, be too intellectually demanding.
It is extremely difficult to see how BPR should contribute to the creation of
new markets or to what Miles and Snow (1978) have called “prospector-
strategies”. If BPR suits a particular type of strategy at all, then it is a defensive
strategy which is based on cost avoidance and high efficiency and which may
be particularly useful in declining markets (Walker and Rueckert, 1987). BPR is
not attractive for organizations which pursue growth strategies. Operational
approaches seek to enhance employee productivity, not to create new markets
or products.
This point is well captured by Hamel (1994), an important guru who has
vented his doubts as to BPR on more than one occasion. He mocks the idea of
productivity improvement by pointing out that British workers are among the
most productive in the world but that this is nowhere reflected in terms of
market share:
Going through the same retrenchment wringer, ridding themselves of unneeded management
layers, outmoded work rules and cumbersome bureaucracies, few of these firms are managing
to grow in real terms. With a static revenue line, these firms are losing relative share in world
markets. Yet, if the typical approach to restructuring, with its dominator focus, grants
productivity gains only at the expense of global market share, efficiency programmes may do
as much harm as good (Hamel, 1994, p. 71).
One does not necessarily have to agree with Hamel’s own ideas about
unrestricted globalization, economic growth and competitiveness in order to
appreciate his challenge to managers:
Slimming down the workforce and cutting back on investment is inherently less intellectually
demanding for top management than discovering ways to grow output on a static or only
slowly growing resource base. Cutting the buck is easier than expanding the bang; thus the
preference of the former over the latter (Hamel, 1994, p. 71).
Hamel’s drift is to make clear that the real problem of many western companies
is not their lack of productivity but their persistent belief that productivity is
the single most important key to long-term success.
BPR presupposes the infinite malleability of employees
Once I received a glimpse of a case-worker. He played a role in an information
film produced by a well-known Dutch insurance company. The case-worker had
his headphones on and a small microphone constantly threatened to jump into
his mouth. With wires he was connected to the advanced computer that was
placed right in front of him on a very tidy desk. A voice-over explained that the
whole set-up offered some considerable advantages. The computer was, for
example, able to put through a phone call of a customer to the case-worker
without any delay. That is, the case-worker simply heard in his headphones
someone talking. What has been removed from the interaction between
employee and customer was the former’s discretion as to decide when to pick up
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the phone. Neither is there any unnecessary hand movement to, say, a telephone.
In the redesigned company not even a second can be wasted and nothing is left
to chance.
There are more interesting details surrounding the film presentation. The
office in which the case-worker carried out his no doubt stultifying job was in
brilliant white and very spacious. Redesigners do not like (“differentiating”)
rooms or offices with pleasant photos or posters on a nearby wall. An abstract
and ridiculously expensive painting on a white and distant wall is the last
decoration that might be visible.
As soon as the customer talked to the case-worker, the latter immediately
knew what to do: typing all data into the computer, waiting for a second or two
for the results to appear on the computer screen, reading the results into the
microphone and ending by stating how much he liked helping the customer.
However, the customer obtained so much information that one really wonders
whether even the most intelligent among us would be able to absorb it – but it
is not the customer that interests me here. He or she already received too much
compassion in recent management literature. The person who earned all the
compassion in the world was the poor case-worker.
I watched the film with some Antillean managers and hardly anybody could
suppress a pitying smile. One of these managers remarked: “For decades people
have devoted their energy to the improvement of working conditions and this is
apparently the outcome of all their efforts”. Then the real laughter could begin.
We got a little comfort from the fact that the film was acted and not for real. But
it is important to realize that the insurance company was, as the voice-over
carefully explained, only too serious about improving working procedures. The
information film represented nothing less than a vision on how the future
employee is expected to do his or her job.
People working in a redesigned organization are put under a regimen of logic
and computerization. Hammer (1990) often derides the fragmented and stultifying
tasks carried out in the “Smithsonian” and “Fordist” organization, but does this
seriously imply that working for a redesigned organization is less stultifying? Or,
to put it differently, should we really take for granted that the endless de-
differentiation of working procedures enhances the quality of a person’s job?
At face value at least, we cannot charge redesigners with too much solidarity
and compassion. People in redesigned organizations are expected to work harder
and to refrain from exercising any influence on their own job. The assumption
clearly is that people are, as Willmott (1994) would put it, “infinitely malleable”.
BPR underestimates political factors
The advocates of BPR speak enthusiastically about job enlargement and
empowerment. Their expectations in this regard, however, may be totally
unrealistic. See, for example, what Hammer and Champy (1993, p. 111) write
about so-called case teams:
An absence of contention and conflict during re-engineering usually signals that nothing
productive is happening, but contention and conflict among team members should be directed
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towards a common end. “Truth”, said the Scottish philosopher, David Hume, “arises from
disagreement amongst friends”. To us, friends are people with mutual regard and mutual
concern. Team members must be friends who share a common focus: improving the
performance of their process. There is no room for private turf and private agendas.
At face value this is certainly one of the few “soft” passages in Hammer and
Champy’s text. Even a well-known philosopher is quoted. But in the end the
underlying message is harsh enough: in order to improve performance members
of a case team are expected to shelve all personal affairs. The case member who
refuses to do so, will meet serious sanctions and might be expelled from the team.
The same holds for those who are, to put it bluntly, too stupid. In the redesigned
organization, there is, as Hammer and Champy point out, no room for simple
people. Yet, the smart people belonging to the case team are not expected to stand
up for themselves. Such is the grim and strange logic of re-engineering.
Empowerment is about enabling people to make their own decisions with
respect to their own work. However, such decisions are only accepted if they
contribute to the integration of jobs which is one of the essential objectives of
BPR. Freedom of action and opinion cannot be a serious issue in the redesigned
organization if empowerment only relates to people who have shown to be able
to act in the approved manner. Employee influence is only tolerated if the rules
of the game are unconditionally accepted.
The infinitely malleable employee is the fully disciplined employee. His or her
rewards are job enlargement, more responsibilities and more (sham) autonomy.
What is to be done if people are not enthused by these prospects? What is to be
done if they need persuading? The suggestion made by Hammer and Champy is
that people who are reluctant and have doubts about redesigning (for example
because the fear of losing their jobs or merely because of the increased workload)
are not only simple but also malicious. There is no consideration whatsoever for
anxieties and emotions among workforce. Resistance should be handled by
starting a relentless offensive against dissenters and/or by value-driven and
inspired leadership. But who is, one might be inclined to ask, really simple and
malicious here? An amazing knack of persuasion on behalf of managers is simply
taken for granted. They should, as Willmott (1994, p. 42) has argued, be able “to
persuade turkeys to vote for Christmas”. I think that the widespread resistance
against redesign is a perfect indication that the average employee is not nearly as
simple as BPR consultants seem to believe.
Summarizing, the redesigned organization can only be achieved if you start
with redesigning people. That is, if you want to redesign your organization, you
had better forget about the worries and anxieties of employees and not
underestimate their intelligence.
BPR unjustly draws a bead on middle managers
It is perfectly possible to link BPR to a much wider arsenal of political
measurements aimed at destabilizing the  middle classes in Western societies, a
process which is stimulated by the dominance and aggressiveness of financial
markets (Korten, 1995). Organizations that subscribe to the rules laid down by
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these markets often do not develop serious alternatives for downsizing and
delayering and simply share “a common dedication to the elimination of middle
management” (Scarbrough and Burrell, 1996, p. 183). Since middle managers
form a substantial part of our society’s middle class, it might very well be
argued that organizations with such a dedication do not help to bring forward
societal welfare and peace.
However, having made this moral understatement, it is also worthwhile to
note that there are economic or strategic reasons also for not rounding up
middle management. Prahalad, for example, has repeatedly pointed out that
middle managers are very often not the bone idle and workshy people described
by Hammer, but the carriers of the organization’s core competences (Geber,
1994, p. 37). That is to say, middle managers often have a much closer affinity
towards the product or towards the market than top managers. By rounding up
middle managers, organizations inadvertently eliminate important elements of
their own knowledge base, especially those forms of knowledge which are not
rationally documented or laid down in bulky manuals.
Prahalad’s insights are increasingly being applauded. Floyd and Wooldridge
(1994) have argued that middle managers are not the inert dinosaurs many
people see in them. In their view, middle managers are pre-eminently fit to start
change programmes within organizations. Their argument hinges on the idea
that many of the roles traditionally played by middle managers – strategy
implementation, information gathering, increasing operational flexibility, etc. –
simply cannot be taken on by top managers because they are too detached from
daily affairs within the organization. One can hardly maintain, however, that
such roles are strategically irrelevant. Once more it might be argued that
processes such as BPR generally do not show deep strategic insight.
However, these doubts with respect to BPR do not obscure the general
impression that downsizing and delayering is becoming a quite natural
response to organizational problems. This might very well lead to the sort of
fatalism recently described by Galbraith: “People who are shed, if I may use the
subtle modern term, expect one day to be shedders again, even if they
experience how the great majority of insecure people live” (quoted in
Scarbrough and Burrell, 1996, p. 185). Perhaps this is the sad irony of the
discussion about BPR: the how-to-re-engineer books are bought and read by
precisely those who tend to become its victims.
BPR’s attack on bureaucracy is merely a matter of rhetorics
I would like to point out that Hammer’s idea of bureaucracy is a very populist
one. In his view, bureaucracies simply boil down to masses of paperwork,
redundant procedures and widespread inertia. However, in the footsteps of
Weber many authors (e.g. Clegg, 1990) have claimed that an obsession with
control is the kernel of each bureaucracy. If we take this seriously, BPR is an
example of bureaucratic mentality because it shares its basic obsession. The
way in which control is achieved can be very different. BPR may indeed reduce
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paperwork or eliminate some procedures, but computerized technology allows
for other control tactics.
The anti-bureaucratic tendency which prevails in textbooks on BPR is sham.
Inveighing against the inertia of bureaucracies is an essential element of the
enterprise cult that ruins our organizations, but the bureaucracy may be much
more persistent as some of us might be inclined to think. As Thompson (1993)
has pointed out, in these post-modern times it might be better not to debate the
question whether we are losing our bureaucracies and instead devote all our
attention to observing and understanding carefully how the bureaucracy
changes and adapts itself to new situations. In short, the bureaucracy is not
eliminated; it is compressed and intensified in order to become manageable for
those at the top.
BPR does not serve the organization but capital
It has been pointed out that the impact of BPR on our society should not be
underestimated and that it might very well have some unforeseen and
unwelcome political effects. BPR is driven by the entrepreneurial spirit which
rides roughshod on broad layers of our society. The political ideology behind it
is downright conservative and hinges on ideas like autonomy, economic
independence on behalf of the employee, deregulation, etc. The top within the
organization is allowed to dodge any moral responsibility for employee welfare
just like governments are increasingly allowed to display a total lack of interest
in the fate of the weak in our society.
What companies need are not simple and dependent people but strong “post-
modern nomads” (Van der Zee, 1994) who are willing to view their very own life
as an enterprise. In other words, the ideal employee should interpret his or her
own impending dismissal as a new entrepreneurial opportunity and not as
something frightening.
As has been pointed out by Saul (1993) and many others, all efforts to
undermine the very idea of job security, as well as employee influence, have not
resulted in substantial growth or improved competitiveness. Yet, our business
leaders seem to be addicted to drastic cutbacks, radical changes and massive
layoffs. The reason is that these measures are rewarded by financial markets.
The consequences for our organizations are dire. Who wants to work in a place
where everybody is on tenterhooks because he or she might be the next in line
for dismissal? The only people that might take advantage of programmes like
BPR are not even managers themselves but those who control financial
markets. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued by Whittington (1993) that the
opportunism of capital may in the long term very well turn out to be disastrous
for our organizations. Many managers who serve as paladins of the financial
markets may sooner or later experience “that capital’s ultimate embrace wrings
them, warmly, by the neck” (Scarbrough and Burrell, 1996, p. 186).
BPR is difficult to reconcile with customer orientation
The sanctifying objective of the organization is to satisfy the customer. It is
necessary, therefore, to engage in a partnership with the customer. However, the
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case-worker I saw in the information film was anything but a partner of the
customer. Partnership presupposes equality between the partners, but in the
film the case-worker was never meant to be equal to the customer. He was
simply enslaved by the customer who seemed to be very embarrassed by this
situation (but perhaps she was a poor actress).
Apart from this, I fail to see how service to the customer can retain its quality
if employees are forced to do their work as quickly and efficiently as possible.
An employee whom I happened to know and who works for the post office in
the city where I live, complained about the many reorganization efforts he had
witnessed. Work pressure, he explained to me, was so intense that he simply
was not able to handle problems of the customers in the way he used to handle
them in the good old days. He was repeatedly told by his boss that customers
who did not address their letters properly or even forgot to address them should
not be helped anymore, because making a call in order to ask for the right
address and other activities that might rectify the customer’s shortcoming,
would simply bring the sorting process to a total standstill. There are many
more of these stories to be heard in Dutch organizations. They all serve to
illustrate that the operational and technocratic mentality ingrained in BPR is
very difficult to reconcile with phantasmagoric ideas about superior customer
orientation, unless of course the organization has customers that are as smart
and perfect as the computers that run its working processes. In other words,
redesigned organizations need not only competent workers but also competent
customers. In this respect, at least, there is some equality between the case-
worker and the customer.
BPR offers a very simple representation of work processes
In most texts about BPR, work processes are reduced to surveyable chains of
often simple jobs. Generally, the imagery is deceivingly simple: a small
quadrangle represents activity 1, and is, by means of an arrow, connected to
another quadrangle representing activity 2, etc. This imagery strongly suggests
that people are carrying out their tasks in a strictly formal, if not computerized
way. Of course this is a very well-known problem, but the understanding that
models do not represent complex reality does not seem to take root among the
disciples of BPR. Wastell et al. (1994), however, have argued that even the most
simple tasks demand considerable improvization and problem-solving
capacities. Although these aspects are crucial, models of work processes
usually ignore them. BPR consultants hold on to such models and therefore
tend to ignore informal aspects of work processes.
An objection related to this point is that BPR apparently assumes that the
work process absorbs all events within organizations. In fact, however, many
things happen that seem to be totally unrelated to such a process. I never saw
on all the clever flowcharts presented by consultants people emptying an
ashtray, buying a bunch of flowers or treating their peers to cake. But it is not
unlikely that the redesigned organization has jettisoned such useless habits or
activities.
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BPR implies risks which might be unacceptable to many people
Risk is a subjective phenomenon. What may be an acceptable risk for one, may
be unacceptable for the another. What people think is acceptable very often
depends on the way they judge their own situation. That is, if they deem a
situation to be favourable, they are less prepared to take risks than if they deem
it to be unfavourable. There is quite a lot of evidence to back this up (e.g.
Feigenbaum et al., 1994).
This insight merely serves to back up the claim that people are not always
willing to accept the same sort of risk. BPR implies enormous risks: people will
very likely lose their jobs, investment costs may soar in order to pay for new IT;
consultants are generally very demanding. An example is appropriate here. The
Dutch-based company Philips recently (summer 1996) announced new re-
organizations. In order to overcome the disappointing results over the first six
months of 1996, new dismissals were deemed to be unavoidable. Since 1986
Philips have already dismissed 81,000 employees. There are 265,000 left, most of
whom face a very insecure future because all dismissals in the past apparently
did not bring the hoped-for turnaround. What I believe is most staggering about
such announcements is that the costs of the new re-organization will take
approximately $550,000,000 (Metze, 1996).
The risks involved are enormous and how on earth should an organization
like Philips convince its people (or, for that matter, its shareholders) that they
are acceptable and that money and jobs will not be  wasted? Wastell et al. (1994)
have pointed out that reorganizations such as BPR are only acceptable to the
workforce if the situation is deemed to be desperate. Most BPR programmes
failed because people did not share the management’s judgement regarding the
risk of the situation. I think this will be even more so when the same message
has been stated over and over again during a period of ten years or so.
Moreover, very often people also feel that only their management were taking
advantage of the proposed change (see also MacKendall, 1993). Under such
conditions it seems highly improbable that employees are willing to accept the
risks that BPR offers to them.
BPR presupposes a very perverse view on competition
In many texts on BPR (and management in general), the authors depict a
sinister and ominous world. In a way it resembles the hell depicted in Paul
Auster’s tantalizing novel In the Country of Last Things (1987) in which we read
about a world where “nothing lasts”, where everything, even the weather, is “in
a constant flux” and “where anything is possible” as if you were “born in a
world that has never existed before”. Hammer’s view of the world is Auster’s
horrific nightmare. Managers are taught that the world is a constant threat and
that war with competitors is always imminent. Hammer puts into his readers’
minds a resounding form of paranoia. The world is amoral and nobody can be
trusted. Armament is inevitable and BPR serves as the coat of mail that protects
the manager in a perverse and malicious world. It is a weapon that allows one
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to engage in cut-throat competition with anyone who stands in the way of
success.
In this world view, competion functions as the “noumenal” reality of our
organizations. It exists, it is out there, as if it is independent of our organizations
and their managers (Willmott, 1994). The challenge to be competitive is not only
moral but also has a mystical and metaphysical component as well. What
Hammer and many others tend to overlook is the “essential relativity of
competition” (Saul, 1993, p. 366). Change programmes like BPR tempt us to
forget that competition is man-made, but such a perspective on competition is
perverse. I believe the following quotation illustrates my point:
Given the modern manager’s devotion to an international “standard” of competition, the effect
of the marginal improvement in social conditions brought about in Korea by persistent and
violent street demonstrations has been to weaken Korea’s attractiveness as a capitalist
producer. The citizen who listens to the modern rhetoric of free markets and free men would
assume that a bit more social justice and democracy are good things. The course of Western
civilization has been advanced. The manager, however, sets aside rhetoric when it comes to
specifics. From his point of view, Korea is now less competitive (Saul, 1993, p. 367).
No wonder then that in such a climate BPR is likely to be seen as a panacea and
Hammer as a hero. In view of the intense competition nobody minds extracting
more energy out of people. The idea to avoid competition hardly ever occurs.
Stress, unemployment and the absence of democracy are therefore endemic and
regarded as side effects that are only bemoaned by unworldly idealists. Instead
of trying to solve these problems, one prefers to stir up competition once again.
Hence employees are regarded as villains and thrown into the Tartarus
where they are tied to a burning wheel just like Ixion. In order not to drown they
have to turn around the wheel perpetually. Nobody dares to bring this wheel to
a stop.
Conclusion
We should get rid of the ghost and are very much in need of skilled exorcists, i.e.
people who do not accept the contemporary climate, who really care about the
organization and the people working there, and who are prepared to bundle
voices against a predominant way of managerial thinking. What I have tried to
make clear throughout this article is the perversity of managers and gurus who
refuse to take serious the complexities in our organizations and who are willing
to sacrifice people and even organizations on the altar of competition.
Note
1. I believe it is very important to acknowledge the moral attractiveness of the point made by
Hammer and Champy (1995). After all, the bureaucratic division of labour silences
morality in organizations in the sense that the specialist is not morally concerned about
those who are affected by the total process carried out by the organization, be they
customers, action groups, the neighbourhood or society at large. Rather, his or her morality
is only directed to the workmate “whose successful coping with his own task depends on
the actor’s application to his [or her] part of the job” or to the immediate superior “whose
occupational standing depends upon the co-operation of his subordinates (Bauman, 1989,
p. 195). That is to say, BPR seems to open up the possibility of moral autonomy because it
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seems to encourage employees to think about the direct and indirect consequences of their
actions, whereas the bureaucratic division of labour disencourages such thinking. The
specialist is somebody who farms out the ultimate moral consequences of particular
actions to the coordinating expert. Of course, I am very well aware of the fact that BPR was
not invented in order to encourage decent moral judgement on behalf of the employee – its
reason for being is simply efficiency and profitability – but any attack on specialism and
functional structures, including BPR, may be welcomed on moral grounds.
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